Atc 01036045

STRAMPE,

Case No. 9101646 CV

Plaintiffs,

FINAL PEOPLE --

VS.

PENAL DECREE OF SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE AND JUDGMENT
GAYLE HENDERSON.

PENAL DECREE OF SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE AND JUDGMENT

OF THE PROPERTY OF

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for Trial on January 2, 1992. The Plaintiffs appeared personally and were represented by attorney William M. Ganong. The Defendant appeared personally and was represented by attorney Scott MacArthur. On February 18, 1992, the Court made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On February 24, 1992, the Court made and entered its Interlocutory Decree of Specific Performance, and on April 16, 1992, the Court made and entered its Supplemental Decree of Specific Performance.

This Final Decree of Specific Performance and Judgment supersedes said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Interlocutory Decree of Specific Performance and Supplemental Decree.

IT IS NOW, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

On or about January 9, 1991, by written contract, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 7 in evidence, Defendant Edna McIntosh, then the owner, (herein referred to as "Defendant") agreed to sell and Plaintiffs

 agreed to purchase the real property described therein for the terms contained in said agreement. Defendant was a reluctant seller (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) under economic pressure from absentee ownership of a mortgaged residence which had been vacant for two years (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3), had been declared unrentable because of neglected repairs (Plaintiff's Exhibit 37) and had to be offered for sale "as is." Said contract is fair and equitable and is supported by adequate consideration. None of the economic pressures on Defendant to offer to sell were caused or contributed to by Plaintiffs.

2.

Plaintiffs have performed all conditions precedent on their part to be performed pursuant to their agreement with Defendant except Plaintiffs have not tendered the purchase price because Defendant informed Plaintiffs and the closing escrow agent in writing by letter dated April 18, 1991, Plaintiff's Exhibit 19, that she would not complete the subject transaction. Defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to perform her obligations under said contract by refusing to cooperate or sign any documents to facilitate the subject sale.

3.

The Defendant's refusal to proceed with consummation of the sale to Plaintiffs was a result of her change of mind, not breach by Plaintiffs of their obligations under the contract, Exhibit 7.

4.

Plaintiffs performed in a timely fashion, all of their obligations under said contract except they have not paid the FINAL DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND JUDGMENT - Page 2

purchase price to the closing escrow agent because Defendant repudiated the contract. Plaintiffs obtained a loan commitment for the funds necessary to close the transaction and offered and tendered full performance thereof, but Defendant wrongfully refused and still refuses to accept the same. Plaintiffs were at all material times ready, willing and able to complete said contract. Defendant waived the time of the essence provision of Exhibit 7 by delaying the return of her acceptance, by not complying with well test requirement and by failing to sign and return the required FHA documents.

5.

As a result of Defendant's failure to consummate said transaction in a timely manner, Plaintiffs' loan commitment expired and Plaintiffs were required to apply for a new loan and incur the expenses of a current appraisal, credit report, pest and dry rot inspection, roof inspection and other expenses, the total cost of which is \$1,200.00.

6.

As a result of Defendant's failure and refusal to consummate said transaction and deliver possession of the subject premises to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have had to rent a residence at the rate of \$500.00 per month commencing on July 1, 1991. In addition, Plaintiffs have had to rent a storage unit at the rate of \$47.00 per month and obtain renters insurance at the rate of \$46.50 per guarter.

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7.

Defendant or her agents intentionally took and installed on the subject property a wood stove insert owned by Plaintiffs. In the event the stove insert remains installed on Defendant's specific performance of Exhibit 7, Plaintiffs will be undamaged by reason thereof. In default of that, said wood stove insert has been converted by Defendant to Plaintiffs' loss in the sum of \$1,200.00.

8.

Plaintiffs have no plain, speedy or adequate legal remedy at law because the real property is unique and cannot be duplicated on the open market.

9.

Defendant failed to prove her first affirmative defense.

10.

Defendant failed to prove her second affirmative defense.

11.

Defendant failed to prove her third affirmative defense.

12.

Defendant, although she had wrongfully repudiated the contract and without request by Plaintiffs, express or implied, through error in judgment and mistake of law, made improvements to the residence and property. Those improvements conferred benefit on Plaintiffs in the sum of \$7,552.86 and Defendant is entitled to set off the reasonable value of said benefit against Plaintiffs' special damages.

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The agreement between the parties provides in part:

"... seller shall pay the cost of ... legal fees if seller accepts buyer's offer ... and:

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"(a) ...

"(b) seller fails to consummate the sale."

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14.

Plaintiffs are unable to complete the purchase of the subject property because Defendant's intention to appeal this Final Decree prevents the title insurance company from issuing the necessary mortgage title insurance until the statutory time for filing an appeal has expired, or if an appeal is filed, until the appeal is complete.

15.

The Defendant failed to comply with the requirements of the Interlocutory Decree of Specific Performance by failing to execute and return the documents necessary to close the transaction.

16.

As a result of Defendant's failure to comply with the requirements of the Interlocutory Decree of Foreclosure and to close the transaction in a timely manner, Plaintiffs' second loan commitment expired and Plaintiffs will incur additional costs and damages in obtaining a new loan commitment.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

17.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a Decree of this Court requiring that the Defendant specifically perform the terms of the said

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written earnest money agreement. Due to Defendant's failure to comply with the requirements of the Interlocutory Decree of Foreclosure:

- This Decree shall be deemed to be equivalent to the execution, signature and delivery of the Defendant Edna Gayle McIntosh, who is also known as Edna Gayle Henderson, of all documents reasonably required by the title company to close this transaction including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following documents:
 - Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc. Escrow Instructions; 2.
 - Sellers' Estimated Closing Statement;
- Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc. Preliminary Title Report, which is hereby deemed read, accepted and approved, and a copy thereof acknowledged by said Defendant;
 - Warranty Deed;
- Aspen 01036045 Affidavit entitled Statement Under Oath Regarding Possession, Repairs, Alterations and New Construction;
- U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Form No. OMB 2502-0265;
 - Addendum to HUD-1 Settlement Statement; 7.
 - Amendment to Sales Contract and Mortgagor's Certificate; 8.
 - The Mortgage Company's Sweat Labor Form;
 - Information for Real Estate 1099-B Report Filing; 10.
 - Interest Bearing Account Letter; and 11.
 - Payer's Request for Taxpayer Identification Number. 12.
- Upon the closing of the transaction, this Decree shall be effective to convey to the Plaintiffs Bruce M. Strampe and Susan

R. Strampe, husband and wife, Grantees, the Estate in fee simple of Edna Gayle McIntosh, who is also known as Edna Gayle Henderson in the following described property to-wit:

The N1/2 NW1/4 NW1/4 of Section 16, Township 39S., Range 8 E.W.M., and the N1/2 NE1/4 NE1/4 of Section 17, Township 39S., Range 8 E.W.M. in the County of Klamath, State of Oregon.

18.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment against Defendant for Plaintiff's special damages described in paragraphs 5 and 6, above. As of June 1, 1992, said damages total:

а.	Rent: \$	500/month x	12	months =		٠	6 000
		\$47/month				Y	6,000
c.	Renteria				. -		564

Renter's Insurance: \$46.50/quarter
 x 4 quarters = 186
 Expenses of Second Loan Commitment 1 200

Total to June 1, 1992 \$ 7.950

Plaintiffs are further entitled to a Judgment against
Defendant for their continuing damages for rent, storage, renter's
insurance, purposes and loan costs from May 31, 1992, until
Defendant delivers possession of the subject premises to
Plaintiffs.

19.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment against Defendant for Plaintiffs' costs of suit and attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the terms of the Agreement between the parties.

20.

The Defendant is entitled to an offset, in the sum of \$7,552.86, against the Judgment in favor of Plaintiff.

FINAL DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND JUDGMENT - Page 7

PRETRIAL MOTIONS

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21.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion, prior to trial, to dismiss the Defendant's counterclaim and, in the alternative, to strike the allegations of the counterclaim. Plaintiffs' said Motions are denied. (Appalachian Regional Hospital, Inc. v. Henry, 287 Or 151 (1979); Welch v. Webb, 47 Or App 771 (1980); Brown v. D25, 61 Or App 8, rev. denied 294 Or 682 Restatement of Contracts, § 357(1)e.

22.

Prior to trial, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Dismissal of Defendant Dryden F. McIntosh. Defendant then moved to dismiss the Complaint, or in the alternative, to strike the Complaint for the reason that Dryden F. McIntosh is a party in interest necessary to a full adjudication of Plaintiffs' claim. The Court finds that Dryden F. McIntosh's interest in the subject property was awarded to Edna Gayle McIntosh by the Supreme Court of Alaska. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5) Defendant's said Motions are denied.

23.

Prior to trial, Defendant moved to dismiss or strike Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Counterclaim as untimely. Defendant's said Motion is denied.

POST TRIAL MOTIONS

MOTION TO AMEND INTERLOCUTORY DECREE

24.

Defendant filed a Motion to Amend the Interlocutory Decree of Specific Performance to add the language necessary to make it

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 appealable under ORCP 67B. Defendant's Motion was denied by the Court's letter ruling dated April 15, 1992.

MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

25.

Defendant filed a Motion pursuant to ORCP 72 to stay proceedings. Defendant's Motion was premature and is denied.

MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM

26.

Plaintiffs filed a Second Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim for Quantum Meruit (unjust enrichment). Plaintiffs' said Motion was denied by the Court's letter ruling dated May 7, 1992.

MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL RELIEF

27.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Supplemental Relief requesting that the Court place Plaintiffs in possession of the subject premises pending the completion of Defendant's Appeal of this Final Decree.

28.

Plaintiffs attended the hearing on this Motion held on May 19, 1992. The Plaintiffs sought possession because their current rental arrangement was expiring on May 31, 1992. The Court has found that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a continuing judgment against the Defendant for their rental expenses. Plaintiffs are further entitled to a Supplemental Judgment for damages caused by Defendant's Breach of the Sales Agreement.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Supplemental Relief is denied.

However, if Defendant fails to post an undertaking pursuant to ORS

19.040(1)(b), pending an appeal of this Decree, the Court, on

Motion by Plaintiffs, will reconsider this Order.

DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

- A. Defendant Edna Gayle McIntosh, who is also known as Edna Gayle Henderson, shall specifically perform the obligations of the "seller" set forth in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 7 entitled Oregon Association of Realtors Sale Agreement and Earnest Money Receipt, by signing all documents which are reasonably necessary to consummate the sale of the subject real property to the Plaintiffs, by delivering fee simple title to the Plaintiffs free and clear of all liens and encumbrances except zoning ordinances, covenants, conditions and restrictions, building and use restrictions, utility easements of record, and common to real estate in the area and apparent upon the land, and by delivering possession of the subject property to the Plaintiffs on or before the closing of the transaction.
 - B. This Decree shall be deemed to be equivalent to the execution, signature and delivery by Edna Gayle McIntosh, who is also known as Edna Gayle Henderson, of all documents reasonably necessary to consummate the subject transaction, some of which documents are more particularly described in paragraph 17, above;
 - C. Upon the closing of the subject transaction, this Decree shall be effective to convey to the Plaintiffs, Bruce M. Strampe and Susan R. Strampe, husband and wife, Grantees, the estate of

1 Edna Gayle McIntosh, who is also known as Edna Gayle Henderson, in 2 the following described real property, to-wit: 3 The N1/2 NW1/4 NW1/4 of Section 16, Township 39 S., Range 8 E.W.M., and the N1/2 NE1/4 NE1/4 of Section 17, Township 39 S., Range 8 E.W.M. in the County of Klamath, 5 Klamath County Tax Lots: 6 Code 52 & 21 Map 3908-1700 TL100 7 Code 52 & 21 Map 3908-000-3000 D. Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment against Edna Gayle 8 McIntosh, who is also known as Edna Gayle Henderson for Plaintiffs 9 special damages described in paragraph 20, reduced by the offset 10 described in paragraph 20, in the net amount of \$397.14, plus 11 Plaintiffs' accruing damages, costs of suit and attorney's fees, 12 as provided in paragraphs 18 and 19, above, as follows: 13 14 MONEY JUDGMENT Name of Creditors: Bruce M. Strampe and Susan R. A. 15 Strampe; 16 B. Creditors' Attorney: William M. Ganong, Attorney at Law, 17 635 Main Street, Klamath Falls, Oregon 97601; 18 Judgment Debtor: Edna Gayle McIntosh, aka Edna Gayle 19 Henderson. 20 Amount of Judgment: D. 21 (1) Initial Amount: 22 \$397.14 (2) Accruing Amount: 23 1st day of each month commencing on July 1, 1992, and continuing 562.50 per month on the 24 until possession of the above described real property is delivered 25 26 (3) Costs, disbursements and attorney's fees: To be 27 determined pursuant to ORCP 68C. 28 FINAL DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND JUDGMENT - Page 11

E. Interest:

> Prejudgment: (1) None

(2) Post Judgment: Simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum accrued on the Judgment amounts listed in subsections D (1) - (3), above, from the entry of this Decree until paid. DATED this Waay of Juny, 1992.

> Smald Cu Piper Circuit Court Judge

This form submitted by: William M. Ganong OSB No. 78213 635 Main Street Klamath Falls, OR 97601 Telephone: (503) 884-1721

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TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed rear of said Court, this day of hand of A.D. 19

LYN G. HARDY, Clerk of Court By By Mary Clerk

STATE OF OREGON: COUNTY OF KLAMATH:

Filed for record at request of Aspen Title &	Escrow
of A.D., 19 <u>93</u> at <u>10:53</u>	o'clock A M., and duly recorded in Vol. M93
	On Page 18116
FEE \$90.00	Evelyn Biehn . County Clerk
	By Danley Mulenders